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Abstract
In this paper, I investigate the relevance of a relational approach to nonhuman animal euthanasia, focusing on
companion animals. Recent scholarship in animal ethics, political philosophy and different fields of animal
studies argues for viewing other animals as subjects, instead of as objects of study. Seeing other animals as
subjects with their own views on life, with whom humans have different relations and with whom
communication is possible, has ethical, practical, and epistemological implications for thinking about
nonhuman animal euthanasia. In what follows I aim to shed light on some of these implications, focusing on
euthanasia in the case of companion animals. I first discuss nonhuman animal practices surrounding death and
challenge the view that humans have a privileged experience and understanding of death. In the following
section I further zoom in on the relationship between anthropocentrism and assessing the harm of death for
nonhuman animals. This provides a starting point for the next section, in which I compare human and
nonhuman animal euthanasia in The Netherlands. To conceptualize how we can develop new procedures for
nonhuman animal euthanasia I then turn to interspecies intersubjectivity, and humans’ understanding of other
animals. In the final section I discuss the question of nonhuman animal euthanasia as inextricably linked to the
question of how to live well with other animals, on an ontological and practical level. I end by discussing the
practical implications of this, and briefly investigate how humans can begin to develop new practices
surrounding death, together with other animals.
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Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the relevance of a relational approach to nonhuman animal 
euthanasia, focusing on companion animals. Recent scholarship in animal ethics, political philosophy and 
different fields of animal studies argues for viewing other animals as subjects, instead of as objects of study. 
Seeing other animals as subjects with their own views on life, with whom humans have different relations 
and with whom communication is possible, has ethical, practical, and epistemological implications for 
thinking about nonhuman animal euthanasia. In what follows I aim to shed light on some of these 
implications, focusing on euthanasia in the case of companion animals. I first discuss nonhuman animal 
practices surrounding death and challenge the view that humans have a privileged experience and 
understanding of death. In the following section I further zoom in on the relationship between 
anthropocentrism and assessing the harm of death for nonhuman animals. This provides a starting point for 
the next section, in which I compare human and nonhuman animal euthanasia in The Netherlands. To 
conceptualize how we can develop new procedures for nonhuman animal euthanasia I then turn to 
interspecies intersubjectivity, and humans’ understanding of other animals. In the final section I discuss the 
question of nonhuman animal euthanasia as inextricably linked to the question of how to live well with 
other animals, on an ontological and practical level. I end by discussing the practical implications of this, 
and briefly investigate how humans can begin to develop new practices surrounding death, together with 
other animals. 
Keywords: nonhuman animal euthanasia, interspecies relations, nonhuman animal agency, animal 
death, interspecies communities. 




The question of nonhuman animal euthanasia is not often considered in animal philosophy. 
Animal advocates mainly focus on challenging the killing of other animals for human benefit, and 
often consider nonhuman animal euthanasia to be fundamentally different from human 
euthanasia. Nonhuman animals are thought not to be able to understand their own mortality or 
communicate about death with humans, even though they are increasingly seen as subjects with 
their own perspectives on life across different fields of study including animal ethics, political 
philosophy, and ethology (for example, respectively, Aaltola; Donaldson and Kymlicka; Bekoff, 
The Emotional Lives of Animals). Seeing other animals as unique individuals, with whom humans 
can have different types of relations and with whom communication is possible, however, has 
ethical, practical, and epistemological implications for thinking about nonhuman animal death, 
especially with regard to nonhuman animal euthanasia. Nonhuman animals encounter death, 
experience grief, and many of them understand the finality of death, sometimes including 
awareness of their own mortality (see for example Bradshaw, Elephants on the Edge; King; 
Pierce). Human and nonhuman animals who form communities or share their lives in 
households will also inevitably encounter death. Within current power hierarchies, humans 
sometimes have a duty of care towards other animals, which can include having to make 
decisions about their death or continued life. In what follows I therefore investigate the 
relevance of a relational approach to nonhuman animal euthanasia, focusing on companion 
animals. Developing a critical perspective on nonhuman animal euthanasia is relevant not only 
with regard to improving individual decisions, but also in that it can challenge anthropocentrism 
within society. 
The first section of this paper concentrates on nonhuman animal experiences of, and 
attitudes towards, death. Recent ethological research shows that other animals have their own 
ways of dealing with death, and their own forms of grieving. Using a human standard to measure 
these is problematic for normative and epistemic reasons. In the second section I further 
challenge the view that humans have a privileged understanding of death by zooming in on the 
relation between anthropocentrism and assessing the harm of death for nonhuman animals. This 
provides a starting point for comparing human and nonhuman animal euthanasia in The 
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Netherlands, to which I turn in the third section. In order to take nonhuman animal agency and 
subjectivity seriously, as well as interspecies relations, new procedures for nonhuman animal 
euthanasia need to be developed, in which the agencies of other species are recognized and taken 
into account formally. This requires further conceptualizing interspecies intersubjectivity, in 
order to better understand other animals. In the final section I draw some general conclusions, 
and discuss how the question of nonhuman animal euthanasia is inextricably linked to the 
question of how to live well with other animals, on an ontological and practical level. I end by 
discussing the practical implications of these insights, and investigate how humans might develop 
new practices surrounding death with other animals. 
 
Nonhuman Animals and Death 
Harper and Kohl, two mulard ducks, were rescued from a foie gras factory in New York in 2006 
and taken to a Farm Sanctuary (King 39-40). Both of them were scared of humans and suffering 
from diseases as a result of the force-feeding they had endured. In the sanctuary, the ducks 
became inseparable. In the years that followed, they spent most of their time together, and 
chose not to interact much with other ducks. After four years, Kohl’s condition began to 
deteriorate. When he could no longer walk, the sanctuary staff made the decision to euthanize 
him. Harper was in the barn when it happened. When Kohl had died, he lay down next to him, 
placed his own head and neck over Kohl’s, and stayed in that position for some hours. Harper 
never recovered. In the daytime he sometimes went to the pond where he used to hang out with 
Kohl. He never bonded with another duck, and was more nervous around people than before. 
Two months later, he died.  
While the story of Harper and Kohl, recounted in Barbara King’s How Animals Grieve, 
may seem to be just an anecdote, recent research on animal cognition, cultures and languages 
affirms Darwin’s view that differences between humans and other animals are of degree and not 
kind; this also applies to how nonhuman animals experience and respond to death, as the 
following examples show. Crows, magpies and ravens have mourning rituals (Bekoff, ‘Animal 
Emotions’; Derbyshire). Crows also learn to fear humans who carry dead crows – they 
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communicate about this to others, and remember it for at least six weeks (Swift and Marzluff). 
Elephants are known for their death rituals, and they show interest in the bones of others 
(including ancient bones of unrelated other elephants). They keep visiting the graves of other 
elephants. They may also suffer from psychological traumas when losing others (Bradshaw, 
Elephants on the Edge; ‘Not by Bread Alone’). Chimpanzees have been observed using tools to 
clean the body of a deceased group member (van Leeuwen et al.). Mourning has been observed 
in many species, ranging from ducks and dogs and donkeys to chimpanzees (King). Some 
scientists contend that cetaceans can take their own lives.1 Recognized by humans as highly 
intelligent, dolphins are believed to be able to choose to end their lives. Unlike humans, 
breathing is an intentional act for dolphins; if they want to die, it has been argued, they simply 
stay under water (Greenwood). Scientists continue to investigate whether whale beachings can 
in certain instances be regarded as collective suicides (Palmer).  
Humans are only just beginning to grasp the depth of other animals’ understandings of 
death (Pierce 470), but it is uncontroversial to state that all social animals experience the death 
of others, and that they respond to death and loss in different ways. Philosopher Teja Brooks 
Pribac rightly argues that the question of whether other animals understand death is comprised 
of two sub-questions: whether they understand the physical non-returnability of another animal, 
and whether they understand their own mortality, which requires reflective consciousness (78). 
In analysing nonhuman animal understandings of death, humans often focus on the latter. 
Focusing on cognition in comparing human to nonhuman animal grief, and privileging reason 
over emotion, as is often done in studying nonhuman animal grief and nonhuman animals’ 
experiences and perceptions of death more generally (Brooks Pribac 70), is problematic for 
several reasons.  
First, nonhuman animals’ awareness of their own mortality is of secondary relevance in 
experiencing the death of others, since lack of such understanding does not preclude the feeling 
of grief (Brooks Pribac 80). Expressions of nonhuman animal grief may vary widely between and 
within populations, based on the relationship to the deceased as well as the individual’s ontogeny 
and personality (King 7-10). While nonhuman animal grief is often viewed as different to human 
grief on the premise that humans may be able to consider the implications of death to a different 
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degree, this does not mean that nonhuman animals’ grief is emotionally less intense. Here it is 
important to remember that grief is the other side of love. Animals of many species are 
entangled in relations with others. Those who love – and many other animals love (see, for 
example, Bekoff’s The Emotional Lives of Animals) – also grieve (King).  
Second, these considerations are often speculative: in many cases humans do not know 
whether other animals understand their mortality. Increasing evidence for nonhuman animals’ 
capacities for bi-directional mental time travel and anticipation (Roberts), and for experience 
learned fear (Swift and Marzluff), combined with the fact that death is often a recurrent 
phenomenon in the lives of other animals, shows that humans cannot automatically assume that 
other than human species have no such understanding. Furthermore, research questions set the 
scope for the answers other animals can give, and are often based on stereotypical views of them 
(Meijer). In order to further investigate nonhuman animals’ understanding of and relationship 
with death one should keep open the possibility that they comprehend more than is currently 
assumed by many humans, and study them as subjects with their own perspective on life instead 
of as objects that only act on instinct.  
Third, and relatedly, taking human expressions of grief as a blueprint for interpreting 
the behaviour of other animals obscures the many ways in which animals of different species may 
express themselves.  
Finally, this emphasis on reason and cognition is a western human phenomenon, and 
does not correspond to a universal truth. Responses to death and grief may differ between 
different human2 and nonhuman cultures, and a dualistic view, in which ‘human’ is separated 
from ‘animal’ or ‘nature’, is a cultural construction. This construction is prominent in the 
western philosophical tradition (Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am). A focus on cognition, 
in investigating nonhuman animals’ relations to death, often serves and reinforces an 
anthropocentric view, since it affirms a human rationalist paradigm, in which humans are seen as 
categorically different from other animals and reason is seen as separated from emotion and the 
body. This view is not normatively neutral: reason is valued over emotion, and culture over 
nature. To develop a different idea about nonhuman animals and death, we need to move 
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beyond this anthropocentric view of death. Before I turn to investigating possibilities for 
developing a different perspective on nonhuman animals and death, I therefore first discuss the 
connection between anthropocentrism and determining the harm of death for other animals. 
 
Anthropocentrism and Nonhuman Animal Death 
In the history of western philosophy, the harm of death for other animals is often interpreted as 
fundamentally different from the harm of death for humans. Perhaps the most striking example 
of this is found in the work of phenomenologist Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger 
(Being and Time), nonhuman animals cannot die because they do not exist as ‘beings towards 
death’ – something they show in the fact that they do not use human language. Instead, they 
simply perish. He contrasts this with human Dasein, that understands itself as Being. Nonhuman 
animals exist in the world and they experience the world, but, according to Heidegger, they 
cannot reflect on and express their own being in the world and therefore have no access to the 
world as such. Heidegger sees a sharp line between human and nonhuman animals based on his 
assumption that other animals lack reason and language; he describes this as a ravine (The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics).  
 Even though many humans would not go so far as to say that nonhuman animals cannot 
die, Heidegger’s view that humans are categorically different from other animals and that all 
nonhuman species can be grouped together, is still widespread. Philosopher Jacques Derrida 
(The Animal That Therefore I Am, 26-28) and others (Wadiwel, Wolfe) have convincingly argued 
that there is a connection between seeing nonhuman animals’ deaths as categorically different 
from human deaths, and the idea that there is little harm, or even no harm, in killing them. The 
latter idea is interconnected with practices that exploit nonhuman animals. This works as 
follows: viewing humans as categorically separated from other animals is often connected to 
viewing them as superior to other animals; viewing humans as superior to other animals 
legitimates killing and using them for human benefit. Anthropocentrism is thus inextricably 
linked to practices involving animal death, such as eating other animals. While human 
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exceptionalism is increasingly challenged in the life sciences as well as in moral and political 
philosophy, most societies still heavily rely on killing other animals, economically and culturally.   
Animal rights and animal liberation theorists usually oppose these practices by arguing 
that other animals are similar to humans in morally relevant respects. They refer to sentience, or 
capacities that resemble human cognition or rationality, in order to argue for extending moral 
and political considerations, or rights, to other animals. While few theorists in these fields 
would defend the Heideggerian standpoint that other animals cannot die, many do see epistemic 
and normative differences between human and nonhuman animal death (Višak and Garner), 
often referring to cognitive differences (see Singer, in Višak and Garner 229-236, see Višak for a 
critique) to argue that their deaths count less than human deaths. This is not simply an empirical 
question, because this line of thought follows the logic of an anthropocentric framework and 
sees the human as a standard against which we should measure other animals (Wolfe). Using 
human standards to assess the harm of death for other animals obscures their ways of expressing 
themselves. It also refers to an idealized view of the human, as having privileged access to a 
universal truth (Oliver 282-287), which is presented as neutral but in fact follows from unequal 
power relations (Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am). Animals – of the nonhuman and 
human kind – are not one group: there are many differences between individuals, species, and 
social groups, and some nonhuman animals are much closer to human animals, in terms of 
capacities, emotions, cognition and relations, than others (Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I 
Am). It is furthermore problematic to state, as Heidegger did, that humans can completely 
understand themselves as beings towards death, both with regard to whether humans actually 
understand their own being in the world, and with regard to whether they fully grasp the 
meaning of death. 
Many current practices involve serious animal suffering and an appeal to nonhuman 
animal sentience is enough to strongly condemn those. Rights are strong tools for establishing a 
better position for nonhuman animals, and they are important to strive towards, because they 
could greatly improve the lives of the billions of nonhuman animals who are currently used by 
humans for human benefit.3 There are also, however, situations concerning nonhuman animal 
death in which rights are not enough, and where taking their agency into account is important 
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for normative and epistemic reasons. This leads us to the question of nonhuman animal 
euthanasia. In certain circumstances death may be the best option for nonhuman animals – just 
as with humans – and humans can help other animals die. Other animals have their own unique 
perspectives on and experiences of their lives, and these should be taken into account in 
euthanasia procedures. This is necessary in order to take individual animals seriously as subjects 
and not repeat anthropocentric assumptions and practices. In the next section I explore this 
further by comparing nonhuman and human animal euthanasia in the Netherlands. 
 
Comparing Human and Nonhuman Animal Euthanasia 
In the Netherlands, as well as in Belgium and Luxembourg, human euthanasia is legal. 
‘Euthanasia’ refers to a self-chosen death, either indirectly, by ending life-prolonging therapy, or 
directly, by actively ending someone’s life. In the latter case there is a difference between 
assisted suicide, in which a doctor gives a patient medication with which to end life (a practice 
that is also legal in certain other European countries), and cases in which a doctor ends 
someone’s life for them. The latter practice is often what is meant by euthanasia, and here I will 
focus on these cases. The criterion for euthanasia is ondraaglijk en uitzichtloos lijden, which 
roughly translates as ‘hopeless and unbearable suffering’. This can apply to both physical and 
mental illnesses. There are fixed procedures that need to be followed: cases for example always 
have to be assessed and approved by two doctors, one of which has no prior relation to the 
patient, and there should be no other solution possible.4  
Euthanasia is accepted as a practice by 92% of Dutch citizens (Trouw). The majority of 
humans who choose euthanasia are cancer patients in the final stages of their disease and there is 
no public debate about this group. There are however cases that are disputed, both by doctors 
and the general public. I will here focus on two of these, concerning dementia and mental 
illnesses.5 Ususally, in the case of dementia, patients in the early stages of the disease sign an 
euthanasieverklaring, a declaration stating that they want euthanasia when they reach a certain 
stage of the disease. The problem here is that when they get to that stage, they can no longer 
express their desire to die clearly – which is one of the prerequisites for the procedure to be 
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completed legally – and it also sometimes happens that they do not want to die anymore. With 
mental illness the process is similar to that with physical illnesses, but the issue here is often the 
difficulty of finding two doctors who both believe that the situation has no prospect of 
improving. In the case of depression for example, a desire to die might be considered to be a 
symptom of the disease, and often doctors will want the patient to try a new therapy or 
medication. 
Choosing death may seem straightforward in many cases, and the procedures 
surrounding it may seem clear. The reality behind these procedures is however often quite 
complicated. In the cases of mental illness and dementia especially, interpretation and 
knowledge of context are required. In order to assess whether the criteria for euthanasia are 
met, doctors need to know more about the patient than just their medical record: they need to 
know about their history, understand their modes of expression, compare interpretations of 
their wishes and behaviours with those of companions who know them well, and so on. These 
aspects are also important in thinking about nonhuman animal euthanasia.  
 Nonhuman animal euthanasia is a widespread and often unquestioned practice, whether 
it regards companion animals in households or shelters,6 farm animals, animals in laboratories, 
or stray animals. The word ‘euthanasia’ in the case of nonhuman animals is often simply used as 
a euphemism for killing (see also Pierce 476). It can, for example, refer to the killing of 
laboratory animals who have been made to suffer for human benefit, once they are considered of 
no use anymore, instead of offering them the possibility to be adopted or live out the rest of 
their lives in other ways. It can also refer to the killing of companion animals because humans 
cannot bear the costs, financial or emotional, of continued medical care. While death might save 
some of these nonhuman animals from more suffering, there are options available for others 
which may prolong and improve their lives. Thinking about nonhuman animal euthanasia 
therefore means first of all clarifying this concept, and not simply using it for all cases in which 
humans seek to eliminate nonhuman animal suffering through killing (Lorenzini).  
In what follows I concentrate on the cases in which humans do not benefit economically 
or otherwise from the death of the nonhuman animals in question, and in which the human 
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caretakers – companions, vets, or others – genuinely believe euthanasia is the best option 
available for these animals. Examples would be a cat who suffers greatly from kidney failure and 
has, after intensive therapy, no prospect of improving, even though he might live for a few more 
months; or the case of a city pigeon who is hit by a car and who would otherwise inevitably die a 
slow death. These types of cases raise two interrelated sets of questions. The first set of 
questions regards whether humans have a right, or even a duty, to choose death for others when 
they suffer unbearably and have no prospect of improving. The second set of questions 
concentrates on how one should approach nonhuman animal euthanasia respectfully, in the 
current state of knowledge about nonhuman animal cognition, emotion, and cultures, and how 
nonhuman animal agency can be taken into account in the process. 
Humans and other animals are entangled in many relations; some may involve 
dependence on each other. In current power structures, humans determine important aspects of 
the lives of many other animals. Domesticated nonhuman animals have been made dependent on 
humans, human infrastructure and activity determines the space to move for many individuals 
and communities, and so on. In certain cases, this can lead to duties of care, including duties of 
medical care (Donaldson and Kymlicka 123). While increasing the freedom of nonhuman 
animals – be it through reformulating relations, or through installing rights – is an important 
goal for those concerned about their fate, in the current anthropocentric circumstances humans 
sometimes need to take care of other animals and make decisions for them.7 
This does not mean that humans should adopt a patronizing attitude. Other animals 
express themselves and influence humans’ lives as well as vice versa, and humans need to 
recognize and foster animals’ agency within relationships. In the case of euthanasia, this means 
taking them seriously as subjects with their own perspectives on life, and paying attention to 
their experience of the situation. Human procedures surrounding euthanasia can shed light on 
how to go about this. At first glance it may seem problematic to compare human and nonhuman 
euthanasia procedures. After all, it seems as if nonhuman animals cannot speak and make their 
wishes concerning their lives known. Even in the case of humans with dementia and mental 
illnesses, they have at some point clearly expressed their desire to die. Recent research on 
nonhuman animal languages and cultures shows however that other animals have complex and 
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nuanced ways of expressing themselves (Meijer). These need to be taken into account, in much 
the same way as in the human case. As we are only beginning to understand the depth of many 
nonhuman animal languages, currently more interpretation is required than when human 
language is used between humans in standard ways. In assessing nonhuman animals’ wishes to 
die, humans should therefore be at least as careful as in human euthanasia procedures.  
In human euthanasia procedures, many aspects are taken into account, concerning the 
physical and mental health of the patient, their age, medical prospects, possible alternatives and 
so on. There is no one formula: human individuals may respond to pain differently, have 
different attitudes towards life, and respond differently to medication. Patients and doctors 
discuss this over several meetings, in which the human patient is at the centre of attention. In the 
case of nonhuman animals it is usually a human – the vet, a human companion, or both – who 
decides what happens and why. In order to improve these procedures, humans need to first 
move from regarding the other animal as an object to seeing her as a subject, not just on the 
individual level, but also legally. The growing scientific understanding of other animals’ 
cognitive, emotional and social capacities can inform further developing these interspecies 
procedures. Humans should also look for ways to interact with other animals differently, in 
order to actively search for the nonhuman animals’ perspectives on the matters concerned 
(Meijer). In addition to medical knowledge of vets, individual knowledge of nonhuman animals, 
their histories and expressions, as members of a species and as singular individuals, should play a 
role. The temporal dimensions of these processes need to be taken into account: coming to a 
judgment might ask for multiple meetings. Different humans who stand in relation to the 
companion animal in question should be consulted, in order to avoid one-sided interpretations. 
 
Understanding Other Animals 
Improving euthanasia procedures to take better account of animals’ perspectives and choices 
should involve communicating with other animals about their desire to die. This is not the same 
as speaking with humans about death, since humans and other animals lack a formal common 
language in which this concept can be expressed. Not using the word ‘death’, however, does not 
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mean that animals cannot communicate to humans the desire to end their pain – and perhaps, 
sometimes, to end their life. As noted earlier, nonhuman animals do experience death, lose 
others, and express their feelings about this. Humans might not know whether, or which, other 
animals comprehend their own finitude, but humans do not have all the answers either when it 
comes to death, or choosing death. Practices surrounding human euthanasia are often 
complicated too and involve more questions than answers. Furthermore, the term ‘euthanasia’ 
has different meanings in different cultures – the Dutch attitude towards human euthanasia has 
been criticized in many other countries, while for those living in The Netherlands the practice is 
fairly uncontested in most cases.  
In order to further develop methods of discussing death with other animals, it is 
important to learn more about their languages, cultures, and relations with members of their 
own and other species. Other animals are often stereotyped as silent, because they do not speak 
in human words, even though they communicate in complex and nuanced ways amongst 
themselves, and with significant humans in their lives (Meijer 78-80). Between dogs and 
humans, words, sounds, smells, chemicals, glances, movements, gestures, developing common 
habits, playing, and other means of communication can for example play a role (Meijer 79). 
Further investigating nonhuman animal languages, and agency in species-specific and interspecies 
relations, would improve human understanding of them and make possible new forms of 
interaction.  
Knowing other animals is often considered to be fundamentally different from knowing 
humans. Because humans use human language, it is possible to gain insight into their minds, it is 
thought; other animals lack human language and thus this option is not open in human 
encounters with them. As discussed above, other animals have their own languages and can 
communicate with humans, but the problem runs deeper than this. Scepticism towards 
nonhuman animal minds reflects cultural values (Brooks Pribac 78-83, Derrida, The Animal That 
Therefore I Am), and, more importantly, it is not how intersubjectivity works. In a critique of 
scepticism about other human minds, Wittgenstein puts this as follows: ‘My attitude toward him 
is an attitude towards a soul: I am not of the opinion that he has a soul’ (Philosophical Investigations, 
178). In everyday encounters, humans, and other animals, approach others as subjects. That 
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they are subjects is one of the certainties that cannot be proven, but that are needed to acquire 
knowledge (Wittgenstein, On Certainty), and more fundamentally: to simply live. Seeing others 
as subjects, and not as machines or objects, enables one to get to know them, and not the other 
way around. In the case of nonhuman animals this means encountering them as individuals who 
engage with others in meaningful ways and shape common worlds with them, instead of as 
beings who are stuck in their species-specific behaviors.8 
An example of this approach can be found in the work of ethologist Barbara Smuts, who 
describes how she became attuned to baboons and dogs by living and moving with them, and 
how their embodied interaction allowed new, common, worlds to come into being (Smuts, see 
also Meijer 83-87). Paying attention to nonhuman animals in this way can offer humans a 
starting point for gaining a better understanding of their views on questions of life, and death. 
 
The Good Life, The Good Death 
The question of nonhuman animal death is inextricably linked to the question of how to live well 
with other animals. The conclusion of this paper therefore investigates how humans can develop 
new practices surrounding death with other animals. Before I turn to this, I draw some general 
conclusions with regard to nonhuman animal euthanasia. 
The word ‘euthanasia’ is currently used as euphemism for many practices in which other 
animals are killed, and because this word is used to make their deaths seem beneficial, it 
functions to obscure, or even legitimate, the violence behind it. Using the right word for these 
acts, which is often ‘killing’, is important in challenging this. There are however cases in which 
other animals might want to end their pain, or perhaps even die, and where using the word 
euthanasia is appropriate. Even in this context, there are significant differences between human 
and nonhuman animal euthanasia. In making the decision to end their lives, nonhuman animals 
are often treated as mute, and it is standard practice for humans to choose death for them, 
without many legal regulations, whereas human euthanasia follows strict procedures, in which 
the subject concerned decides what happens. In order to do justice to nonhuman animals, 
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humans should not only amend legal regulations, but also further develop the procedures 
surrounding nonhuman animal euthanasia together with other animals.  
There are many different ways of dealing with death; finding out more about how other 
human and nonhuman communities, and nonhuman animals in shared interspecies communities, 
relate to death does not impoverish the concept, but instead makes it richer. In order to further 
find out more about how other animals understand and experience death, humans need to 
attend to them and create spaces for them to act in ways they think suitable. Human views of 
other animals are currently often formed by prejudices that follow from centuries of oppression, 
and many practices are aimed at oppressing them; we do not know how this would evolve once 
they are provided with the options to expand their choices, both with regard to how they 
express themselves, and how they want to relate to humans.  
Improving procedures regarding nonhuman animal euthanasia is also interconnected 
with improving interspecies relations on a societal level. Thinking about euthanasia, or striving 
to improve euthanasia legislation concerning companion animals, might seem frivolous in a 
world in which many nonhuman animals are killed and made to suffer daily for human interests. 
Bringing to light nonhuman animal agency and subjectivity in different fields can however help 
to change views about the place that nonhuman animals have in communities, and cultural 
practices are interconnected with political structures. Furthermore, arguing that nonhuman 
animal death is a topic worth discussing, and a matter in which other animals have their own 
standpoints, is overdue in a world that systematically disregards their lives and perspectives. 
 It is important to remember that humans are also animals. Death separates us from 
others, human and nonhuman, at least physically, but it also connects us to them, because as 
animals we all share the fate that we will die at some point. According to Derrida (The Beast and 
the Sovereign vol. I and II), death overrides Heidegger’s view of human sovereignty because 
animals, human or nonhuman, do not have to be sovereign to be able to die: death happens to 
them. It challenges the distinction between active and passive, and between human and animal. 
While some animals can choose death, no animal can choose not to die. We do not know when 
we will die, or often how, but that we will die is certain – all animals are bodies, we are all 
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vulnerable. Humans and other social animals also have in common that they love and lose others 
(Bekoff; King), of their own and other species – species is not the defining characteristic in 
building common worlds and being with others (Derrida, Meijer, Smuts). Sharing one’s life 
with others of different species allows them to shape your world, as you shape theirs. When our 
loved ones die, our worlds are broken. Thinking about the death of the animals close to us 
should start there, in the shared vulnerability that characterizes us, and the relationships that 
connect us.  
 
New Directions 
There are several ways in which interspecies procedures surrounding nonhuman animal 
euthanasia can be improved. Legal scholars and political philosophers can further explore how 
legislation concerning human euthanasia compares to nonhuman animal euthanasia. Existing 
legislation should be changed to safeguard nonhuman animal interests, and to take into account 
their unique ways of being and knowing the world. New empirical studies about nonhuman 
animal grief and mourning (such as Bradshaw, Elephants on the Edge; King; Pierce), language 
(Meijer) and cultures (Donaldson and Kymlicka; Smuts), can improve human understanding of 
other animals and offer starting points for acting differently.  
In the context of nonhuman animal euthanasia, it is not only relevant to explore 
connections with ideas about human euthanasia; it is also imperative to deal differently with 
nonhuman animal suffering. Nonhuman animals are not stuck in the present, as was long thought 
(Pierce 464) and in many cases they might benefit from prolonged life. Palliative care, and 
nonhuman animal medicines more generally, need to be further developed, and killing practices 
as well (Pierce 475).9 Vets should be trained in ethics, in order to make more balanced 
decisions.  
 Humans can develop new ways of living with other animals (Donaldson, Smuts), 
focused on enlarging nonhuman animals’ freedom and fostering their agency, for example in 
farm sanctuaries, wildlife rehabilitation centres, and households. In these spaces, new 
interspecies practices can be developed with regard to nonhuman animal death. Euthanasia is of 
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course only one aspect of nonhuman animal death. Allowing other animals to experience the 
death of their companions, by being present when the companion dies, is for example also 
important. This can help them understand the situation, and perhaps also allows an opportunity 
to say goodbye, and to begin grieving. Taking nonhuman animal grief and mourning seriously is 
a necessary condition for being able to offer them comfort, which, as the case of Harper and 
Kohl shows, may not always be possible. Finally, new interspecies rituals could be developed 
together with other animals, to accompany them in their last days. 
  




1 See also Bekoff, ‘Did a Female Burro Commit Suicide? Some Compelling Stories Suggest 
Animals Do Take Their Own Lives.’ 
2 Brooks Pribac mentions two examples: senicide and ‘delayed personhood’ (81). Senicide, 
described as ‘mercy killing’, refers to the killing of elderly people by their children when they 
feel that they cannot look after them properly, or that caring for them would endanger their 
own and their children’s survival. Delayed personhood is found in societies with high infant 
mortality and refers to the practice of considering infants not fully human due to the uncertainty 
of their survival. This leads to emotional distancing, and sometimes even delaying naming the 
child for a certain period of time. 
3 Because rights are often modeled on the human, animal advocates, activists, and philosophers 
should also investigate the ways in which they might perpetuate anthropocentrism and challenge 
the underlying mechanisms of exclusion. 
4 There are six requirements that need to be followed in order for the procedure to be legal. 1. 
The doctor has to be convinced that the request for euthanasia was voluntary and informed. 2. 
The patient’s suffering is unbearable and has no prospect of improving. 3. The doctor has 
informed the patient about her situation and prospects. 4. Both the doctor and patient reached 
the conclusion that there is no other solution possible. 5. The doctor consulted at least one other 
doctor, who also saw the patient and had no prior relation to the patient. This second doctor 
provided a written statement, based on the due diligence guidelines. 6. The euthanasia is 
performed in accordance with medical guidelines. 
5 There are other examples, such as very old people who feel they have lived a full life and do 
not wish to continue it, but the problem there is not so much of interpretation and as with 
accepting the reasons for someone’s desire to end their life. Another example concerns children. 
Children over 12 years old can opt for euthanasia, if they can show they understand what it 
entails and express their wish coherently (doctors often mention children being wise beyond 
their years). While there is some debate about this group, the phenomenon fortunately is rare. 
 
 




6 For an analysis of killing nonhuman animals in shelters, see Palmer. 
7 It is important to recognize that humans also live in webs of relations, and human euthanasia 
involves dependence on others on a very fundamental level – someone helps you die. 
8 See also Aaltola (2013) on empathy and intersubjectivity. 
9 Without using and killing other nonhuman animals, for ethical reasons. 
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